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DELIBERATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM (2018) 
(Cambridge University Press, Jeff King, Hoi Kong, Ron Levy & Graeme Orr eds.) 
 
 
Chapter 2: 
Deliberative Constitutionalism in  
The National Security Setting 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Mary B DeRosa* 
Mitt Regan** 
 
 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Deliberative democracy may seem both especially important and especially 
unsuited for application to national security matters. On the one hand, decisions relating to 
national security often involve issues of life, death and the fate of political communities. 
This suggests that it is especially crucial that decisions reflect the core values of 
deliberative democracy.  
 
 Two particularly important values in this setting are deliberative rigor and 
transparency, or public reason-giving. Deliberative rigor requires that decisions are made 
thoughtfully, with full assessment of the widest range of considerations, by persons who 
are genuinely open to other viewpoints and who make decisions based on the force of the 
better argument.1 Transparency requires that officials publicly explain the reasons for their 
decisions in terms that citizens can endorse as acceptable grounds for acting in the name 
of the political community – even if some citizens disagree with the outcomes of the 
decision making process.2 This requirement furthers the perceived legitimacy of decisions, 
which provides ‘moral grounds for obedience to power as opposed to grounds of self-
                                                        
* Distinguished Visitor from Practice, Georgetown Law Center. Professor DeRosa served as Legal Adviser 
to the US National Security Council from 2009-2011. 
** McDevitt Professor of Jurisprudence; Co-Director, Center on National Security and the Law, Georgetown 
Law Center. We would like to thank Ashley Deeks and David Koplow for thoughtful comments on an earlier 
draft of this chapter. 
1  Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Beacon, Cambridge, MA 1975) 108. On the importance of 
deliberative rigor, see Zsuzanna Chappell, Deliberative Democracy: A Critical Introduction (Palgave 
Macmillan, 2012) 8 (‘Deliberative Democracy’). 
2 ‘All theories of deliberative democracy contain something that could be called a publicity principle. The 
principle has many forms but almost always involves a claim about the salutary effects of going public with 
the reasons and arguments backing up a policy, proposal, or claim’ (Simone Chambers, ‘Behind Closed 
Doors: Publicity, Secrecy, and the Quality of Deliberation’ (2004) 12 Journal of Political Philosophy 389, 
390). 
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interest or coercion.’3 Both deliberative rigor and transparency seem especially important 
in light of the potentially momentous decisions that need to be made in the national security 
setting. We want those decisions to be made thoughtfully, and we want citizens who may 
have to make significant sacrifices to trust that decisions that require this have been made 
for the right reasons.  
 
  National security decisions, however, tend to be less transparent than most other 
exercises of power. Officials may regard it as imprudent to provide complete details of 
decisions they have made, to offer a full description of the reasons for those decisions, or, 
in some cases, to make any disclosure at all about certain decisions. This circumspection 
may occur not only with respect to the public, but with members of Congress and even the 
judiciary. The national security decision-making process therefore often may fall short of 
the requirement of fully transparent public reason-giving.  
 
 While such reason-giving is especially important to the perceived legitimacy of a 
decision, anticipating the need for it also can enhance deliberative rigor. Limited 
transparency thus creates the risk both that decisions will not be regarded as legitimate and 
that the deliberative process will not be as robust as it should be. In addition, there is 
typically little opportunity to include citizens in the decision-making process, which some 
theorists regard as an essential feature of deliberative democracy. 4  The limited 
transparency that often characterises national security decision-making thus may suggest 
that the insights of deliberative democracy have minimal, if any, application in this setting. 
 
 Notwithstanding these challenges, we believe that the critically important nature of 
national security decisions makes realising the goals of deliberative democracy especially 
important in this field. Given limits on transparency and fitful oversight by other branches, 
as well as minimal opportunities for direct citizen participation, we maintain that ensuring 
robust internal deliberative processes on national security questions within the executive 
branch is crucial in achieving these goals. This view reflects a version of what Neal Katyal 
calls reliance on ‘internal separation of powers’ to compensate for limitations of external 
oversight.5 Deliberative theory can be especially helpful in determining how to structure 
such processes to help realise deliberative values.   
 
 Our focus in this chapter is on one example of a US government deliberative 
process, which is the use in some administrations of what is called the ‘Lawyers Group’.  
This Group consists of lawyers from all national security agencies who regularly meet to 
discuss how to advise the President and senior national security officials.  
 
 We suggest that this Group has the potential to compensate to some extent for the 
limited transparency that often distinguishes decision-making in the national security 
                                                        
3 John Parkinson, ‘Legitimacy Problems in Deliberative Democracy’ (2003) 51 Political Studies 180, 182. 
4  Seyla Benhabib, ‘Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy,’ in Seyla Benhabib (ed), 
Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton University Press, 1996) 
67, 68. 
5 Neal Katyal, ‘Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within’ 
(2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 2314. 
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setting, thereby enhancing both deliberative rigor and the perceived legitimacy of 
decisions. With respect to deliberative rigor, we suggest that the Lawyers Group can help 
ensure wide-ranging deliberation on national security issues that have legal dimensions. 
With regard to perceptions of the legitimacy of decisions, we argue that the operation of 
the Lawyers Group can help achieve this goal by helping generate justifications that meet 
the requirement of legality. Perceived compliance with the law’s publicly accessible set of 
reasons can foster confidence that decisions have been made on the basis of broad public-
regarding concerns. Such decisions still may be subject to criticism on grounds other than 
legality. As we will describe, however, perceptions of legality and legitimacy are especially 
closely intertwined in American culture.  
 
 Abstracting from the example of the Lawyers Group, our discussion seeks to make 
two distinctive contributions to deliberative theory. First, we focus on its application to a 
field in which full transparency and public justification often may not be feasible. Second, 
we discuss the particular role that legal analysis may play in the deliberative process. In 
what follows, we describe the way in which the US Constitution seeks to further 
deliberative democracy and how the Lawyers Group can help realise this aim in the 
national security setting.  
 
B. DELIBERATION AND THE US CONSTITUTION 
 
 The US Constitution is notable for its reliance on a sharp separation of powers 
among the executive, Congress, and the judiciary. This arrangement is designed to prevent 
the concentration of power within government by ‘giving to those who administer each 
department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist 
encroachments of the others’.6 The prospect of close vigilance by the other branches over 
the exercise of authority also serves deliberative values. It requires that each branch provide 
justifications for acting that the other two branches, and the public, find persuasive. This 
can improve the quality of deliberations, since each branch must anticipate potential 
counter-arguments to its claims of authority by branches that jealously guard their 
prerogatives. To the extent that officials successfully address such objections, their actions 
are likely to be perceived as legitimate.  
 
 As this description suggests, perceived legality and legitimacy are closely 
connected in US political culture. De Tocqueville famously noted at an early point the 
tendency of US citizens to frame political issues as legal ones. 7  With respect to the 
executive branch, Richard Pildes has observed that the public often evaluates presidential 
performance in terms of whether the President is acting in accordance with the law. As he 
notes: 
 
the world of public and political responses to political action is filtered 
through law itself. In so many contexts, no separation between law and 
public judgment exists: public judgment is constantly refracted through 
                                                        
6 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, ‘Federalist No. 51,’ in The Federalist Papers (Signet 
1961) 321-2. 
7 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (J P Mayer & Max Lerner (eds), Harper & Row, 1966) 248. 
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judgments about whether various actors, including the President, are acting 
lawfully.8  
 
 The account above of the relationship among deliberation, reason-giving, and 
perceived legitimacy indicates that legal justification can play an especially important role 
in furthering deliberative goals in the US constitutional system. Law provides a publicly 
accessible set of grounds on which decisions must rely, and thus a common vocabulary of 
justification. The requirement to defend actions in terms that are acceptable within this 
vocabulary creates an incentive to engage in thorough analysis that anticipates plausible 
objections. Decisions that are the product of such a process also are more likely to be 
regarded as legitimate because such rigour suggests to the public that officials have been 
open to all relevant points of view. The more that citizens believe that the decision-making 
process has featured such receptivity to different perspectives, the more confident they are 
likely to be that it has taken into account a wide range of public-regarding considerations 
rather than simply narrow or self-interested ones. The result is that they are more likely to 
accept a decision as made thoughtfully in the national interest.9  
 
 However, how robust can legal justification be with respect to national security 
decisions? Fully transparent legal justification enhances accountability and thereby can 
generate support for a presidential decision – but the President may be constrained in the 
reasons he or she can offer in support of that decision. Assessing the legality of presidential 
action often depends on knowledge of the underlying facts, but disclosing all the facts may 
create risks to national security. Yet failing to fully describe reasons and to disclose 
important facts weakens the persuasiveness of the President’s justification. This can create 
suspicion that the head of the executive branch is transgressing the bounds of authority or 
that he or she is not acting solely on the basis of public-regarding reasons.  
  
 This state of affairs can create a dilemma for other branches of government on 
national security matters. A President’s declaration of the need to act to address a threat to 
the country, even if based on information that the President cannot fully disclose, may 
make Congress reluctant to resist lest it incur blame if the threat materialises. In addition, 
courts have a variety of doctrines that they employ to avoid review of national security 
decisions, as well as to limit disclosure of sensitive information even when they do accept 
jurisdiction. Some observers suggest that these dynamics have eroded legal constraints on 
presidential national security power,10 while others acknowledge expansion of such power, 
but contend that some meaningful constraints nonetheless remain.11    
 
                                                        
8 Richard Pildes, ‘Law and the President’ (2012) 125 Harvard Law Review 1381, 1411. 
9 ‘[C]itizens are more likely to accept defeat in democratic politics if they feel that their views have received 
a fair hearing and if they find the reasons offered for this decision acceptable’ (Chappell, Deliberative 
Democracy, above n 1, 49). See also Robert Goodin, Motivating Political Morality (Blackwell, 1992) 132-
3; Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton University Press, 2004) 
3.  
10 Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic (Belknap, 2010); Eric A Posner and 
Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
11 Jack Goldsmith, Power and Constraint (W W Norton, 2012). 
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 We do not fully assess these claims here. We believe that the executive continues 
to face some constraints, but we also accept that presidential national security power has 
expanded in recent decades. We also acknowledge the risks that limited external oversight 
can pose to deliberative democracy. If the executive knows it will not have to offer rigorous 
justifications for its decisions to other branches and the public, the decision-making process 
may not be as robust as it should be. As Simone Chambers describes, the requirement to 
justify oneself to others creates  
 
‘the necessity to articulate one’s position carefully, to defend it against 
unexpected counter arguments, to take opposing points of view into 
consideration, to reveal the steps of reasoning one has used, and to state 
openly the principles to which one appeals’.12 
 
If there is minimal likelihood that other branches or the public will demand a full well-
reasoned explanation for a decision, the quality of the deliberation that precedes it may 
suffer. This in turn can impair its perceived legitimacy.  
  
 The close connection between perceptions of legality and legitimacy in US political 
discourse may address this risk to some extent. This means that the executive is likely to 
continue to feel obligated to frame justifications in legal terms. This obligation can create 
an incentive to ensure that such justifications are regarded as legitimate because they are 
grounded in rigorous and persuasive legal analysis. In the next section, we suggest that 
reliance on the Lawyers Group in arriving at decisions can help serve this function.  
 
C. LEGAL DELIBERATION IN NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING 
 
In this section, we discuss the role of legal deliberation in the national security 
decision-making process and describe the operation of the Lawyers Group.  
 
1. The Role of Legal Analysis 
 
Lawyers and law are integral to day-to-day national security policy and operational 
decision-making in the United States, to a degree that some might find surprising. Perhaps 
the most significant reason is that there are few policy questions that do not involve 
significant legal issues. Jack Goldsmith, for instance, has criticised a trend toward what he 
regards as undue intrusion of law into foreign policy matters, resulting in what he calls the 
‘judicialization of international politics’ and the ‘criminalization of warfare’. He also 
points to the growth of a ‘human rights culture’ and the expansion of international law 
enforcement through universal jurisdiction and international courts, as well as an increase 
in domestic laws that relate to military and intelligence operations.13  
 
                                                        
12 Chambers, above n 2, 391. 
13 Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency (W W Norton, 2007) 53-63. 
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Regardless of one’s view of this trend, it has increased the importance of lawyers 
in national security decisions.14 Policy-makers may fear exposure to criminal laws, or, 
more commonly, they are aware that the public perception of illegality will undermine 
support for policies. A President and his or her national security team confronting questions 
about, for example, the use of force or intelligence operations therefore must navigate legal 
requirements and prohibitions with implications for them and the long-term success of their 
policy.  
 
In addition, the line between law and policy is not always clear. It is often difficult 
to separate international relations and international law, since customary behaviour can 
become law. For example, a state’s decision about how to respond to a novel provocation 
can, over time, affect the law in that area, particularly if other states follow suit. Similarly, 
countries will react to a policy or action in part based on their perception of its legality. 
The roles of lawyers and policy-makers are closely related on issues such as these, and 
decision-makers therefore typically have little choice but to consult their lawyers. 
 
 This close relationship between national security policy-makers and their lawyers 
creates the possibility that distinctive features of the legal reasoning process can enhance 
the quality of decision-making on policy issues. As Ian Johnstone suggests, legal reasoning 
can serve as a ‘disciplining force’ in national security deliberations: ‘Legal deliberations 
are bounded: certain types of argument and styles of reasoning are acceptable and accepted; 
others are not’. Legal analysis can limit the terms in which justification can be offered to 
those for which there are common evaluative criteria. As Johnstone observes: ‘Any 
language, including the language of the law, can plausibly be stretched only so far’.15 
 
 We do not suggest that legal analysis is able to provide unqualified, clear answers 
and therefore plays this role. In fact, many legal questions do not have a single, correct 
answer. Rather, the purpose of legal reasoning is, as Edward Levi describes, to ‘provide[] 
for the participation of the community in resolving … ambiguity by providing a forum for 
discussing policy in the gap of ambiguity’.16 Levi describes the basic pattern of legal 
reasoning as a three-step process: ‘similarity is seen between cases; next the rule of law 
inherent in the first case is announced; then the rule of law is made applicable to the second 
case’.17 This basic formulation conveys how lawyers are trained to deliberate. The process 
is linear, sensitive to factual context, and looks to precedent and generally applicable rules.  
 
 Lawyers therefore have an opportunity to enhance national security policy 
decisions because lawyers are integral to the policy-making process. They will only realise 
this potential, however, if their advice is based on rigorous and thoughtful analysis. For 
several reasons, engaging in such analysis is especially challenging in the national security 
setting. 
                                                        
14 For a discussion of this trend during the past several years, see Charlie Savage, Power Wars: Inside 
Obama’s Post-9/11 Presidency (Little Brown & Co, 2015). 
15 Ian Johnstone, ‘Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council: Bringing Down the Deliberative 
Deficit’ (2008) 102 American Journal of International Law 275, 280 (‘Legislation and Adjudication’). 
16 Edward Hirsch Levi, ‘An Introduction to Legal Reasoning’ (1948) 15 University of Chicago Law Review 
501, 501. 
17 Ibid 501-2. 
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First, there are very few fields in which the stakes are as high. If policy-makers 
believe that a course of action will save lives, lawyers will feel tremendous pressure to find 
legal justification for it. At the same time, for security reasons, only a small circle of people 
is privy to the most important matters. This can force lawyers to be more insular than is 
healthy. They have few peers with whom they can discuss the issues, and often feel 
uncomfortable reaching out to others to vet legal arguments and analysis. This deprives 
them not only of the benefit of different perspectives and expertise, but of the reinforcement 
that peers can provide in support of advice that may be difficult for policy-makers to accept.  
 
In addition, there are fewer external checks on legal advice in the national security 
area than there are in most other fields, and less judicial precedent on which to rely. 
Members of Congress have less insight into the legal advice provided in this area than they 
do in other settings, and, when they do, they are constrained in how widely they can discuss 
it. US courts are reluctant to become involved in national security legal matters, relying on 
various doctrines to avoid review in sensitive matters. Legal analysis is also less available 
to the public for comment and criticism. All this can threaten to diminish the quality of 
legal advice on some of the most sensitive matters that a decision-maker must consider.  
 
2. The Lawyers Group 
 
One mechanism that has developed within the executive branch to address these 
challenges is the Lawyers Group. This Group comprises the senior lawyers from the major 
national security agencies who meet regularly to deliberate and reach consensus on legal 
advice for the President and his senior national security advisers.18  
 
The only formal reference to the Lawyers Group has been in an earlier classified 
directive from President George H W Bush, which set out a process for consideration of 
covert action proposals. In the presidential administrations of William Clinton and Barack 
Obama, the Lawyers Group has been used regularly to address a wide range of legal 
questions relating to national security issues that require a presidential decision.19 The 
Group might consider legal questions regarding intelligence or military operations, 
questions about imposing or implementing economic sanctions, cyber operations or cyber 
defence, issues related to treaty interpretation or treaty negotiation, immigration law, 
criminal law and process, sovereign immunity, or any other legal issues that relate to 
national security or foreign policy.  
 
 The Lawyers Group’s core participants include the National Security Counsel (NSC) 
Legal Adviser, who is the President’s senior national security lawyer; the Assistant 
Attorney General in charge of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), 
the Justice Department office charged with providing legal advice to the executive branch; 
the chief legal officers of the State and Defense Departments, the Office of the Director of 
                                                        
18 The discussion that follows of the operation of the Lawyers Group is based on Professor DeRosa’s 
experience as legal adviser to the National Security Council from 2009-2011. 
19 The George W Bush Administration used the Lawyers Group sporadically and primarily for intelligence 
matters.  
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National Intelligence (DNI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); and the Legal 
Adviser to the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
 
 The Lawyers Group typically will convene at the request of the NSC Legal Adviser 
to consider legal issues relating to policy issues before the President. Often, it must resolve 
legal questions on time-sensitive matters and members must work quickly. The Lawyers 
Group originally met mostly in person, in the office of the NSC Legal Adviser. As secure 
communications technology has advanced, more meetings are held virtually, using secure 
video teleconference. On most major issues, the meetings will include all Lawyers Group 
participants, but some meetings will involve a subgroup. For example, if the issue involves 
no intelligence matters, the NSC Legal Adviser might not invite the DNI or CIA General 
Counsels, or Defense Department participants might not be included in a meeting involving 
purely intelligence issues (although they would always be included in a discussion of covert 
action). The Lawyers Group can also be expanded on occasion if the issue involves a matter 
on which another office has particular expertise. For example, it might include lawyers 
from the Treasury Department if the topic relates to financial sanctions.  
 
 Those who attend the meetings ideally will have considered the issues beforehand, 
although if an issue arises quickly, that may not be possible. They will often bring 
additional lawyers with expertise in the issues under consideration. Sometimes one or more 
of the participants will have prepared papers that the Lawyers Group reviews during the 
meeting. Led by the NSC Legal Adviser, the Group will work through the issues and 
attempt to reach a consensus, which each member can communicate to his or her respective 
organisations. Sometimes the results of the deliberations will be recorded in a paper that is 
approved by all parties. 
  
 Participants bring distinct legal expertise and perspectives to the discussion. This 
permits them to raise questions and concerns that others might not have considered. When 
someone identifies an unanswered factual question, the lawyer whose agency is closest to 
the facts will seek out the answer. Sometimes the groups will meet with non-lawyer subject 
matter experts, such as intelligence analysts, to ask questions relevant to the legal issue.  
 
 Members of the group derive their authority from their organisations, which creates 
an environment in which all members are on equal footing. Although the NSC Legal 
Adviser convenes the meetings and generally chooses the topic, he or she does not have 
any greater voice in the deliberations than other members. Nor does the Adviser have the 
authority to decide between two competing legal views. This is because NSC staff 
members, although they have significant influence based on their proximity to the 
President, have no authority of their own. Although the President has the authority to 
overrule his cabinet officers on a question of policy or law, his NSC staff does not. This 
enhances the ability of members to interact on a relatively equal footing, with their 
influence determined by the persuasiveness of their arguments rather than their formal 
positions. While particular agencies may receive more deference with regard to specific 
issues on which they have more expertise or operational involvement, no agency is in a 
position to assert superior formal authority over the others. 
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 The one complication in the equality among Lawyers Group participants involves 
OLC. This office assists the Attorney General in his or her statutory function as legal 
adviser to the President and executive branch agencies. Although this authority generally 
has not extended to purely international law questions,20 OLC at least theoretically has the 
authority to provide a definitive executive branch interpretation of any domestic law 
questions that come to the Lawyers Group. While this does not reflect a formally binding 
decision on legality such as a court would render, nonetheless it is influential because of 
the relative rarity of judicial review of national security matters. OLC does not 
automatically assume this role in the Lawyers Group, however, because its role in the 
Group differs somewhat from its role in other areas. Typically, OLC does not become 
involved in the day-to-day formulation of legal advice by agency lawyers. The White 
House and agencies have discretion about when to reach out to OLC, and do so primarily 
when a question is particularly difficult or controversial, or to resolve legal disagreements 
between agencies. OLC may provide its advice orally or in a written opinion, but it does 
so on discrete questions and only after a formal request from an agency.  
 
 The Lawyers Group process broadens OLC’s role by involving it more in the 
development of legal advice. The Group benefits from this because OLC has long 
institutional experience in many of the key areas of law and its lawyers are usually highly 
qualified. In addition, OLC lawyers tend to have less of an institutional stake in a particular 
outcome and can play a useful neutral role. OLC benefits as well because it is involved in 
legal discussions at an earlier stage. In the course of Lawyers Group discussions, OLC 
representatives operate much as other participants do — they give the benefit of their 
expertise and perspective, but, until asked otherwise, provide informal contributions, rather 
than definitive legal opinions. Nonetheless, all other participants understand OLC’s unique 
role and tend to see the OLC representative as the most important person to persuade.  
 
D. THE LAWYERS GROUP AND DELIBERATIVE THEORY 
 
The Lawyers Group process we have described above provides a form of deliberation 
that we believe can enhance the quality and perceived legitimacy of national security 
decisions.  
 
1. Deliberative Rigor 
 
 Deliberative theory emphasises several conditions for rigorous deliberation. One is 
equality among members of a deliberative group.21 The Lawyers Group provides a non-
hierarchical and inclusive environment that encourages the kind of reciprocal, other-
regarding debate that theorists consider critical. Each member derives his or her authority 
from his own institution and no one participant has the power to force a particular result.22 
                                                        
20 The State Department Legal Adviser has historically played this role for purely international law issues. 
During the George W Bush Administration, however, the international law responsibility shifted to OLC as 
well. 
21 Chappell, Deliberative Democracy, above n 1, 26.  
22 There are potential tie-breaking mechanisms, but they are unappealing. One of the lawyers could request 
a formal legal opinion from OLC, but in addition to being divisive and potentially quite slow, there is no 
guarantee that OLC will come out the way they want. It is also possible to have the clients bring the 
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These features encourage all members to express their views and to believe that their 
reasoning will be taken seriously.  
 
 Theories of deliberative democracy also suggest that ‘[t]he aim of ideal deliberation is 
to arrive at consensus’,23 even though they recognise that actual practice will rarely attain 
this ideal. Lawyers Group participants share the aim of achieving consensus in part because 
they must. They understand that without doing so, they cannot serve their clients 
effectively. Clients need answers to the questions the lawyers are considering; if they do 
not reach a consensus the policy-makers are left without answers or must wait for a formal 
OLC opinion. In addition, legal debates may occupy considerable time during policy 
discussions, which delays the ability to make a decision. Neither of these scenarios reflects 
well on the lawyers.  
 
 Another incentive for consensus is the powerful influence of the group identity that 
Lawyers Group participants develop. The Group provides the participants a community 
with which to identify. This strengthens each member’s relationship with his or her own 
organisation. If legal advice is unwelcome, the lawyer is not alone; the backing of peers in 
the Lawyers Group strengthens his or her position.  
 
 Jane Mansbridge et al maintain that a ‘healthy deliberative system is one in which 
relevant considerations are brought forth from all corners, aired, discussed, and 
appropriately weighed’. 24  The fact that participants identify with their organisations’ 
concerns brings a broad base of knowledge into the discussions. Although they are all 
national security lawyers, participants can differ significantly in terms of expertise and 
perspectives. As Neomi Rao suggests, for instance:  
 
[A] number of legal departments have responsibility for international law 
interpretation [and]… each of these agencies has a particular institutional 
perspective, culture, and set of incentives with regard to providing advice 
about the interpretation and application of [such] law.25  
 
Thus, the Defense Department tends to look at questions through the lens of their impact 
on military operations and its commitment to the law of armed conflict, while the State 
Department is especially attentive to the views and reactions of other nations.  
 
 Each point of view itself may be limited; focusing solely on any one of them can 
lead to a myopic disregard of broader concerns. Bringing all these perspectives into the 
group, however, leads to a productive tension and creates the possibility of harmonising 
                                                        
disagreement to the President to decide, but it would reflect badly on the lawyers to impose on the President’s 
time in this way. 
23 Chappell, Deliberative Democracy, above n 1, 26. 
24 Jane Mansbridge et al, ‘A Systemic Approach to Deliberative Democracy’ in John Parkinson and Jane 
Mansbridge (eds), Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale (Cambridge University 
Press, 2012) 1, 11 (‘A Systemic Approach’). 
25 Neomi Rao, ‘Public Choice and International Law Compliance: The Executive Branch is a “They”, not an 
“It”’ (2012) 96 Minnesota Law Review 194, 199. 
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them into a fuller comprehension of all relevant considerations. This produces stronger, 
more informed and more useful legal analysis. As Katyal has suggested:  
 
[A] well-functioning bureaucracy contains agencies with differing missions 
and objectives that intentionally overlap to create friction. … When the 
State and Defense Departments have to convince each other of why their 
view is right, for example, better decision-making results.26 
 
This process can play out in a variety of ways. Often the participants begin with 
different views, tracking the interests and perspective of their organisation. Participants 
may coax, advocate, and argue. They may look for ways around the disagreement or seek 
ways to frame a conclusion in terms with which all can agree. When they cannot reach 
agreement, the participants may put the question aside or try to address those parts of it on 
which they can agree.  
 
The differing perspectives of Lawyers Group participants thus contribute to the kind of 
communicative rationality that Jürgen Habermas describes, in which actors share 
knowledge with each other in order to arrive at a mutual understanding.27 The nature of the 
community and incentives for consensus lead participants away from their parochial 
perspectives. The participants do not abandon their interests, but they open themselves up 
to the reasoned arguments of others and find common ground that is informed and 
enhanced by those individual perspectives. This is what Mansbridge et al describe as an 
‘expansion of the classic ideal’, in which the goal is not complete consensus, but mutual 
justification. In this version of the idea, ‘participants in deliberation advance 
“considerations” that others “can accept” – considerations that are “compelling” and 
“persuasive” to others and that can be justified to people who reasonably disagree with 
them’.28  This criterion of ‘mutual justifiability’ has become central to the concept of 
deliberation.29  
 
 Johnstone has suggested that law is a distinctive form of discourse that can fulfil 
deliberative values through the work of interpretive communities ‘who – by arguing and 
reasoning with each other – in effect pass judgment on what constitutes a good legal 
claim’.30 Thus, anyone engaging in legal analysis:  
 
is a participant in a particular field of practice and is engaged in interpretive 
activity that must be persuasive to others. In that capacity, he or she acts as 
an extension of an institutional community; failure to act in that way would 
                                                        
26 Katyal, above n 5, 2317. 
27 Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (Thomas McCarthy trans, Beacon Press, 1984) 
vol 1: ‘Reason and the Rationalization of Society’. 
28 Jane Mansbridge et al, ‘The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative 
Democracy’ (2010) 18 Journal of Political Philosophy 64, 66. 
29 Jane Mansbridge et al, ‘The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative 
Democracy’ (2010) 18 Journal of Political Philosophy 64, 67 (citations omitted). 
30 Johnstone, ‘Legislation and Adjudication’, above n 15, 281. 
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be stigmatised as inconsistent with the conventions and purposes of that 
community.31 
 
The Lawyers Group serves as an interpretive community whose work is influenced in 
turn by a larger such community. While practical and policy considerations are relevant, 
all participants understand that legal advice is the goal and that the way to prevail in a 
discussion is to present the best legal argument. Thus, although lawyers often begin by 
promoting the interests of their agencies, as the discussion progresses this instinct is 
tempered by their desire to maintain credibility in the group. The views of others in this 
interpretive community matter to its members, and one loses respect in that community by 
persisting in a flawed legal argument solely because it supports the lawyer’s agency’s 
interests.  
 
Discussion in the Lawyers Group in turn is influenced by a broader interpretive 
community: experts in academia and practice who comment on and critique the legality of 
government actions in blogs, articles, conferences, and other fora. Because of the 
sensitivity of the issues they consider, participants in the Lawyers Group are rarely able to 
reach out directly to this broader national security interpretive community. Increasingly, 
however, Lawyers Group participants are aware of this discussion and can draw on it in 
their own deliberations. In addition, they know that this community may well learn about 
their analysis and pass judgement on it. This larger interpretive community thus has a 
positive, if indirect, influence on the quality of Lawyers Group deliberations.  
 
The degree to which this broader interpretive community represents the views of the 
public at large should not be overstated, however. The legal community outside of the 
government is relatively small and the views of those who have previous national security 
experience in government can have outsized influence. Although the community provides 
more diverse input, it is not a perfect substitute for the kind of broad citizen participation 
that represents the ideal in deliberative theory. 
 
In sum, features of deliberation in the Lawyers Group give it the potential to contribute 
to a thorough and well-reasoned national security decision-making process. In the next 
section, we discuss the extent to which the Group can also help enhance the perceived 
legitimacy of the outcomes of that process. 
 
2. Perceived Legitimacy 
 
 As we have described, an important reason for deliberative democracy’s emphasis 
on transparent reason-giving is to ensure that those who are subject to decisions accept 
them because they perceive that the reasons are legitimate. Such a perception is grounded 
in the belief that decisions have been made on the basis of appropriate public-regarding 
considerations that citizens can endorse, even if they may disagree with particular 
decisions. Deliberative democracy has focused mainly on the perception of legitimacy with 
respect to the particular political jurisdiction on whose behalf decisions are made. 
                                                        
31 Ian Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument’ (2003) 14 European 
Journal of International Law 437, 445. 
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Considerable scholarship, however, underscores the crucial role of perceptions of 
legitimacy on the international level as well. 32  Indeed, Ian Clark suggests that such 
perceptions serve in an important way to ‘constitute international society’. 33  Our 
suggestion that the Lawyers Group helps further deliberative values therefore must 
evaluate the extent to which it enhances the perceived legitimacy of national security 
decisions to both domestic and international audiences.  
 
 Some deliberative theorists focus on the inclusion of citizens in the decision-
making process as an especially significant means of enhancing the perceived legitimacy 
of decisions.34 If people believe that they have had an opportunity to express their concerns 
and views, and that others have genuinely listened to and taken them into account, they are 
likely to regard the ultimate decision as legitimate even if it does not fully reflect their 
preferences. Inclusion thus can be a valuable way of bolstering perceptions of legitimacy. 
Various types of face-to-face ‘micro’ decision-making processes that feature a combination 
of officials and citizens are examples of such inclusion.35 
 
 Other deliberative theorists suggest that, while such inclusion can be valuable, 
obtaining the involvement of all persons who will be affected by a decision is simply 
infeasible. 36 Even experiments in ‘micro’ decision-making settings can include only a 
small number of persons, who may not be representative of the larger relevant population. 
The ideal of full inclusion is even less feasible in the national security setting in light of 
the often-sensitive nature of the information that is relevant to effective decision-making. 
The Lawyers Group does nothing directly to correct for this. Is there some other way in 
which the Group can contribute to the perceived legitimacy of decisions that incorporate 
its recommendations? 
 
 We can best assess the contribution of the Lawyers Group to perceptions of 
legitimacy by viewing it as one part of a larger deliberative system, whose overall 
deliberative capacity it strengthens. John Dryzek suggests that: ‘Different sites can 
contribute to deliberative capacity in different proportions, in different societies and 
systems. We should not fixate on any one institutional contributor to this mix and assume 
that it is the key to deliberative capacity’.37 Similarly, another prominent group of scholars 
argues: ‘To understand the larger goal of deliberation…it is necessary to go beyond the 
study of individual institutions and processes to examine their interaction in the system as 
a whole’.38 Indeed, they suggest: ‘What might be considered low quality or undemocratic 
                                                        
32 Thomas M Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford University Press, 1990); Ian Clark, 
Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
33 Clark, above n 32, 6 (emphasis in original). 
34 Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2000); Benhabib, above n 4; 
Bernard Manin, ‘On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation’ (1987) 15 Political Theory 338. 
35 Zsuzsanna Chappell, ‘A Tension between Ideal and Practice: Re-Evaluation of Micro and Macro Models 
of Deliberation’ (2010) 46 Representation 295 (‘A Tension’). 
36 John Dryzek, ‘Legitimacy and Economy in Deliberative Theory’ (2001) 29 Political Theory 651; John 
Parkinson, ‘Legitimacy Problems in Deliberative Democracy’ (2003) 51 Political Studies 180. 
37  John Dryzek, ‘Democratization as Deliberative Capacity Building’ (2009) 42 Comparative Political 
Studies 1379, 1383. 
38 Jane Mansbridge et al, ‘A Systemic Approach’, above n 24, 2. 
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deliberation in an individual instance might from a systems perspective contribute to an 
overall healthy deliberation’.39 
 
 This perspective allows us to see the Lawyers Group as one site of micro 
deliberation in a larger national security decision-making system. The question therefore 
is the extent to which its distinctive features contribute to the deliberative capacity of this 
larger system so as to enhance the perceived legitimacy of that system’s outcomes.  
 
 Work by deliberative theorists on the conditions under which private micro 
deliberation may be appropriate suggests how the Group may further this goal. First, 
Chappell argues that micro deliberation ‘has special importance as a source of well-
reasoned judgment in the political decision-making process’ because it ‘follows the ideal 
model of deliberative democracy more closely’ than deliberation in larger public settings.40 
She suggests that micro deliberation works best when the number of participants is limited 
and ‘the topic of deliberation has been well defined in advance’.41 This is consistent with 
Habermas’s ‘two-track’ theory of deliberation, in which macro deliberation serves to 
identify broad guiding principles, which micro deliberation then translates into specific 
decisions.42  
 
 The Lawyers Group represents micro deliberation that plays a specific role in a 
larger deliberative process by focusing on relatively discrete issues that require legal 
analysis, rather than on wide-ranging policy issues. Consistent with Chappell’s 
prescription, participants have a specific agenda to frame their discussions, and aim to 
arrive at a definite recommendation on a particular issue. The goal is limited and concrete, 
focusing not on the articulation of broad values but on arriving at an answer to a specific 
question. The Group’s deliberations thus respect the role of the macro, or larger public 
sphere as ‘the background from which normative values, preferences and attitudes emerge 
and where they are discovered’.43 
 
 Deliberative theory acknowledges that there are some instances in which ‘the 
quality of deliberation improves if debate takes place behind closed doors’.44 As Chambers 
suggests, ‘there is something about going public, opening up deliberation to a broad 
audience and mass media, that has a deleterious effect on deliberation’.45 The result may 
be what she calls ‘plebiscitory reason’, which is a form of ‘shallow public reason’ that 
reflects speakers’ desire to ‘please the largest number of people possible or wanting to 
appear firm and decisive in the public’s eye’.46  Mansbridge and her co-authors also note: 
‘Particularly when faced with life and death decisions, experts sometimes need deliberative 
protection from the ignorance, emotional volatility, and myopia of the non-expert’.47 
                                                        
39 Ibid 3. 
40 Chappell, ‘A Tension’, above n 35, 295. 
41 Chappell, Deliberative Democracy, above n 1, 11. 
42 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (MIT Press, 1996) 307-8. 
43 Chappell, Deliberative Democracy, above n 1, 15. 
44 Chambers, above n 2, 392. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Ibid 394. 
47 Mansbridge et al, ‘A Systemic Approach’, above n 24, 14. 
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Private deliberation may improve the quality of deliberation by avoiding these risks, 
thereby leading to decisions more likely justified on grounds perceived as legitimate.  
 
 The secrecy of the Lawyers Group helps avoid what may be an especially 
significant risk of plebiscitory reason on national security matters. Such matters can elicit 
highly emotional reactions because of fears about safety and security, anger over perceived 
transgressions, and desires for vengeance. Legal analysis cannot occur in a vacuum that is 
insensitive to the larger political context, but deliberation in private among a group of peers 
can at least minimise the extent to which reasoning is affected by such influences.  
 
 Chambers observes that secret deliberation avoids the danger of plebiscitory 
reason, but creates the risk of private reason.48 This may involve participants reaching an 
outcome simply by bargaining rather than reason-giving, or appealing to narrow reasons 
not shared by the larger public. Chambers argues that we can reduce the risk of reliance on 
private reason by ensuring that, ‘on fundamental questions that affect the broad public, the 
more secret and closed is the debate, the more important it is that all possible points of 
view are represented’.49 A secret deliberative process that features such diversity can earn 
greater perceived legitimacy despite the absence of citizen involvement.  
 
 The fact that the Lawyers Group includes lawyers from all agencies with interests 
in the national security decision at hand is consistent with this requirement. The Group 
neither perfectly mirrors the populace as a whole nor persons outside the United States, so 
we cannot claim that it fully compensates for the absence of participation by persons 
affected by presidential decisions. Our more limited claim is that it at least ensures the 
inclusion of viewpoints from a large number of national security agencies, each of which 
has its own perspective, expertise, and constituencies. While we should explore how other 
components of the larger deliberative system might arrange for inclusion of broader public 
views, the Group at least attempts to maximise inclusion of all parties with an interest and 
expertise in national security law.  
 
 Deliberative theory also suggests that when issues are highly technical, awareness 
that experts have engaged in a robust deliberative process can produce ‘a second-order 
reason to trust its conclusions when the first-order reasons for and against the different 
choices required expertise beyond the grasp of most citizens’.50 Expert authority ‘is itself 
often conditionally earned through deliberative means and within specialised deliberative 
communities’.51 When this form of accountability operates, ‘we may trust experts because 
we can ask them to explain and to justify their advice or decisions, if not to us directly then 
to a group of their peers who in turn have earned their credentials in a deliberatively 
trustworthy manner’.52  
 
                                                        
48 Chambers, above n 2, 405. 
49 Ibid 408. 
50 Mansbridge et al, ‘A Systemic Approach’, above n 24, 16. 
51 Ibid 15. 
52 Ibid.  
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 Members of the Lawyers Group possess specialised expertise that requires 
familiarity with a wide range of domestic and international legal sources, an understanding 
of how they interact, and an appreciation of how they have been applied. It is important for 
the Executive to be aware of the best interpretation of these sources of legal authority in 
considering different courses of action. As we have argued, the prospect of accountability 
to peers in the broader national security law community can discipline this process. The 
expertise of Lawyers Group members has been earned through engagement in this 
deliberative community. The operation of the Group can affect the standing of its members 
within this community and thereby constrain any attempt to rely on reasons unrelated to 
the best reading of the law. 
 
 While it may be desirable for secret micro deliberation to occur in certain settings 
within a larger deliberative system, theorists emphasise that the outcomes of that process 
ultimately need to be publicly articulated to be regarded by the public as legitimate. As 
Chappell says, ‘even if deliberation takes place privately, not only do its decisions need to 
be publicized, but also the reasoning that underlies the decisions’.53 To the extent that the 
President publicly justifies his or her decisions, the analysis of the Lawyers Group often 
will be reflected to some degree in those justifications. The public thus will have an 
opportunity to evaluate the quality of this analysis as they assess the persuasiveness of the 
President’s justifications.   
 
 Lawyers Group participants therefore must anticipate how the larger public will 
react to the reason-giving that incorporates the Group’s work. The President needs to 
convince coordinate branches and the public that he or she is acting lawfully for the best 
interest of the country. Robust deliberation by the Group enhances the quality of these 
justifications and the perception that they reflect serious consideration of all relevant issues. 
In this way, the work of the Group can enhance the perceived legitimacy of decisions by 
linking micro deliberation to macro justification.  
 
 Furthermore, to the extent that the President is able to provide only a limited 
substantive justification for his or her decision, he or she can point to the expansiveness of 
the decision-making process itself as an indication that the decision is a public-regarding 
one that takes into account a wide range of concerns. As Chappell notes: ‘If it can be shown 
that the judgement of the deliberative group was reached through reasoned, equal, inclusive 
and other-regarding debate, this gives people a strong incentive to consider this judgement 
carefully’.54 
 
 For these reasons, the Lawyers Group can be seen as one site of micro deliberation 
that can enhance the perceived legitimacy of the overall national security deliberative 
system. Our analysis suggests that much of its ability to further this goal is based on the 
perceived quality and thoroughness of its decision-making process. This can be a crucial 
source of public acceptance of the legitimacy of decisions on the issues of life and death 
that often arise in this arena. As Chappell states:  
 
                                                        
53 Chappell, Deliberative Democracy, above n 1, 116. 
54 Chappell, ‘A Tension’, above n 35, 302. 
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one of the major normative appeals of deliberative democracy is that it 
captures our intuition that political decisions that affect a large number of 
people, if not the entire society, need to be considered carefully. We must 
devote sufficient time and attention to such policies. We should discuss 
them and not make hasty or arbitrary choices.55  
 
Finally, one distinctive aspect of perceived legitimacy in national security decision-
making is the concern that decisions are seen as legitimate not only by a state’s citizens, 
but by the wider international community. As in US culture, perceptions of legitimacy in 
this community are closely tied to assessments of legality. As Abram and Antonia Chayes 
suggest, relations among states are conducted in large part through ‘diplomatic 
conversation – explanation and justification, persuasion and dissuasion, approval and 
condemnation .... In this discourse, the role of legal norms is large’.56 Similarly, Andrew 
Hurrell maintains, ‘being in a political system, states will seek to interpret their obligations 
to their own advantage. But being in a legal system that is built on the consent of other 
parties, they will be constrained by the necessity of justifying their actions in legal terms’.57 
  
In the ways we have described, deliberation within the Lawyers Group thus helps 
enhance the perceived legitimacy of national security decisions in both the domestic and 
international arenas. 
 
3. Deliberative Failure 
 
 The interrelated risks for both deliberative rigor and perceived legitimacy of failing 
to provide for robust internal legal deliberation are starkly illustrated by contrasting the 
Lawyers Group with the process that was used in 2002 to determine if the CIA’s use of 
certain proposed interrogation techniques would violate the Convention against Torture58 
and the US criminal statute that implements it.59    
 
 The CIA and the White House sought advice from OLC on the interrogation 
question. John Yoo, the lawyer given the assignment, did not consult with the State 
Department, which possesses expertise on the Convention against Torture and international 
law more generally. Nor did he consult with the Judge Advocates General (JAGs) of any 
of the military branches, lawyers who have extensive familiarity with detention, torture 
and the law of armed conflict. Instead Yoo worked most closely with the Vice-President’s 
counsel and the White House Counsel. He issued two opinions, one an interpretation of the 
US torture statute, and another applying that interpretation to the interrogation techniques. 
He concluded that the techniques did not violate the statute.  
                                                        
55 Chappell, Deliberative Democracy, above n 1, 161-2. 
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 When the first memo became public in 2004 in the wake of the Abu Ghraib prison 
torture revelations, it was widely criticised as reflecting both poor legal analysis and 
insensitivity to the moral concerns that animate the prohibition on torture. The Justice 
Department Office of Professional Responsibility recommended that both Yoo and the 
head of OLC be referred for professional discipline because the memos violated their 
ethical obligation to provide competent independent legal advice, 60  although this 
recommendation ultimately was rejected by a senior Department official.61 A group of over 
100 lawyers, retired judges and legal scholars signed a statement condemning the memo 
on the ground that it was an effort to ‘circumvent long established and universally 
acknowledged principles of law and common decency’.62 The memos and the conduct that 
they authorised seriously damaged the standing of the United States in both domestic and 
international eyes, undermining the perceived legitimacy of the administration’s counter-
terrorism policy.63  
 
 The fact that the memos were prepared through a process that excluded lawyers 
from other departments was not simply an oversight. The State Department had objected 
earlier when Yoo concluded that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to Al Qaeda and 
Taliban detainees, but the President had sided with Yoo’s interpretation. Both State 
Department and military lawyers are strongly committed to abiding by international law, 
and the JAGs are especially familiar with the potential consequences for US service 
members of US engagement in torture. Indeed, military lawyers strenuously objected a few 
months later when the Defense Department General Counsel sought essentially to adopt 
OLC’s reasoning with respect to interrogations by that Department.64 The OLC memos, 
however, neither anticipated nor engaged with the views of these parties.  
 
 Failure to include all knowledgeable agencies in deliberations about the torture 
statute thus resulted in what is regarded as a remarkably poorly reasoned and unpersuasive 
example of legal analysis. The poor quality of the memo in turn led observers to conclude 
that the United States was not genuinely concerned about complying with the prohibition 
against torture, but simply wanted an ostensible justification for engaging in conduct that 
officials knew was forbidden. In these ways, the constricted deliberative process produced 
a result that was regarded as both unpersuasive and illegitimate.   
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E. CONCLUSION 
 
  There are few areas in which deliberative values are more important than national 
security, but there are also few areas that face as many challenges in realising them. The 
US Constitution attempts to further such values through separation of powers, but this does 
not always operate effectively to constrain presidential power. The Lawyers Group can 
help compensate for this by providing for robust deliberation on legal issues within the 
executive branch that can enhance the quality and perceived legitimacy of national security 
decisions. There are limits to what the Group can accomplish, but we should assess it in 
terms of its contribution to the larger national security deliberative system of which it is a 
part. From this perspective, the Group’s compliance with several prescriptions of 
deliberative theory helps it strengthen the rigor and persuasiveness of the justifications for 
decisions that the President offers.  
 
 Presidents have varied in terms of how they use the National Security Council, and 
there is no guarantee that every administration will organise and use the Lawyers Group in 
the ways that we have described. Even if they do, the process is highly dependent on good 
leadership and on its members and leaders supporting it. We believe, however, that 
establishing a tradition of using it as we have described can contribute to the realisation of 
deliberative values within the US Constitutional system.  
 
 More generally, we believe that our analysis of the Lawyers Group suggests that 
deliberative theory can provide insight into deliberation that does not include public 
participation. After all, much government decision-making does not directly include 
citizens. Furthermore, even when the public has an opportunity to participate in the overall 
process, there will still be stages that involve deliberation only by government actors. 
Deliberative theory can inform how such deliberation should be structured in those settings 
to enhance the quality and perceived legitimacy of decisions. It has the potential to inform 
all phases of a multi-faceted process, not simply those that include citizens.  
 
 Finally, it would be fruitful to examine more closely the role of legal analysis in the 
deliberative process. As perceived adherence to the rule of law becomes a more prominent, 
if imprecise, consideration in perceptions of the legitimacy of decisions, democratic theory 
may help illuminate the circumstances under which decisions are most likely to be regarded 
as meeting this standard. 
